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8. Expeditionary economics: stimulating 
entrepreneurship under geopolitical risk
Robert E. Looney
INTRODUCTION
The concept of Expeditionary Economics (ExpECON) was introduced 
in 2010 in a path-breaking article in the May/June 2010 issue of Foreign 
Affairs, “Expeditionary Economics: Spurring Growth After Conflicts 
and Disasters”, by then Kauffman Institute President and CEO Carl 
Schramm. In that article, Schramm put forth the proposition that eco-
nomic growth is vital for stabilizing post-conflict/disaster settings, and 
the U.S. military, as often the dominant player in these environments, 
must sharpen its ability to encourage indigenous entrepreneurship. It 
was Schramm’s contention that the conventional U.S. approach in recent 
post-conflict recoveries (Dobbins et al., 2007) has failed largely because it 
has abandoned the approach that was so successful in building the U.S. 
economy – the encouragement and support of indigenous entrepreneurial 
initiative and creativity (Schramm, 2010, 2010a).
In Schramm’s original formulation, ExpECON represented a sharp 
rejection of large bodies of received economic and military doctrine. 
His main contention was that “a central element in the failure to estab-
lish robust economies in war-torn or disaster-stricken countries is the 
prevailing doctrine of international development, according to which 
strong economies cannot emerge in poor countries” (Schramm 2010, 89). 
Schramm’s work shares many of the frustrations put forth in Dambisi 
Moyo’s (2010) withering critique of foreign aid programs, and De Soto’s 
(2000) impassioned questioning many of development economics conven-
tional wisdoms. While other authors (del Castillo, 2008; Sweetman, 2009) 
wrote extensively on the contribution of private sector activity to stabiliza-
tion and growth in post-conflict settings, their works have not had nearly 
the impact of Schramm’s contribution.
Schramm makes the case for the military to engage broadly in mid-
conflict and post-conflict reconstruction using a variety of tools. In his 
formulation, economic reconstruction must be a part of a three-legged 
strategy, following invasion and stabilization. To do reconstruction, the 
military needs to expand its areas of competence, rid itself of its central 
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planning mentality, and become a more flexible force that can facilitate 
economic growth while trying to stabilize the regions in which it is engaged 
(Johnson et al., 2012b).
Following its introduction, ExpECON spawned major research 
efforts. It assessed, from an entrepreneurial perspective, the effective-
ness of existing U.S. post-conflict policies and programs in stimulat-
ing economic growth. While originating at the Kauffman Institute in 
Kansas City (Patterson and Stangler, 2010; Schramm, 2010a; Patterson, 
2011; Dahl, 2011; Cusack and Malmstrom, 2010, 2011; Gunter, 2011; 
Looney, 2012) this research effort spread quickly to the U.S. military, 
the U.S. government (Nijsen, 2012), as well as closely related issues 
in academic (Gunter, 2011a; Desai 2010; del Castillo, 2011a, 2011b; 
Collier, 2011), and private sector think tanks (Foust, 2011; Lum, 2012; 
Lemmon, 2012, Davis, 2011; Berteau et al., 2012; Cordesman and 
Mann, 2012). Much of this work has attempted to refine the original 
propositions put forth by Schramm, while assessing their empirical valid-
ity. Other efforts have been focused on examining the applicability of 
ExpECON as a key component in future U.S. operations in post-conflict 
settings.
ExpECON has generated considerable interest because it provides a 
deeper understanding of the dynamics at work in most conflict and post-
conflict disaster settings. More importantly, it lays out an optimistic plan 
to quickly jump-start the economies in what were previously considered 
impossible situations. In addition, there is a growing feeling that in the 
future budget constraints will limit the implementation of the standard 
approaches taken to date by the U.S. to post-conflict settings (IHS, 2012). 
ExpECON has the potential to provide a considerably less expensive 
alternative. There is also a growing feeling in the U.S. military that eco-
nomic conditions are increasingly important relative to military action in 
creating long-standing peace and stability in many of the world’s trouble 
spots and fragile settings. At a minimum, ExpECON has shifted the focus 
of much work on post-conflict recovery to the role of entrepreneurship 
(Lemmon, 2012).
ExpECON MAIN PROPOSITIONS AND ORIGINS 
While each post-conflict setting is unique in possessing a particular set of 
historical, cultural and economic circumstances ExpECON attempts to 
provide a loose framework for understanding and combating instability 
and violence. Faust (2011) summarizes the core elements of ExpECON 
as:
MUNOZ 9780857939746 PRINT.indd   113 10/05/2013   10:08
114  Handbook on the geopolitics of business
Grahams HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:14199 - EE - MUNOZ:MUNOZ 9780857939746 PRINT Grahams HD:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:14199 - EE - MUNOZ:MUNOZ 9780857939746 PRINT
● the strategic deployment of economic development to fix failed 
economies in crisis states;
● fundamentally about business development;
● based on the assumption that economies grow when businesses 
grow; and
● focused on local communities and local businesses.
In contrast ExpECON is not:
● a blueprint for Western foreign direct investment;
● a call for promoting multinational corporations to set up businesses 
in conflict zones; or
● focused on empowering Western aid agencies or NGOs.
The recent experiences of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq illus-
trate in part the conditions leading to these propositions as well as provid-
ing a tangible example of how the application of ExpECON might have 
produced a fundamentally different outcome. In both cases, the inability 
of U.S. and coalition programs to re-start the economy and generate 
viable jobs was one of the key factors prolonging the conflict and signifi-
cantly delaying a return to some sort of stability. 
Afghanistan
Despite billions of dollars spent over the past decade in Afghanistan, the 
capacity of the Afghan government to deliver basic services has remained 
severely limited. In the more remote areas, the government’s presence is 
sporadic at best. Poppy production remains by far the most dynamic part 
of the economy, generating vast profits, much of which is used to finance 
the Taliban (Looney, 2009). With little in the way of local governance 
or finance, illegal activity continues to thrive, further undermining the 
authority and influence of the central government.
Afghanistan’s dire state, as depicted in a report by the U.S. Congress, 
Committee on Foreign Relations (2011) is attributable to a diverse mix 
of factors that has led to the country’s continued deterioration. Much of 
the U.S. aid effort has been selectively used as a stabilization tool for a 
limited number of geographical areas in an attempt to “win hearts and 
minds”. The aid effort has been so massive that an estimated 97 percent of 
Afghanistan’s licit gross domestic product (GDP) is derived from NATO’s 
military activities and donor community presence.
Unfortunately, there is scant empirical evidence that stabilization pro-
grams have actually promoted stability, with some research suggesting that 
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factors such as aid facilitated corruption of government officials have made 
the situation even worse (U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
2011). Similarly, there is little indication that the aid effort has stimulated 
private sector activity and associated job creation. Rather than benefit the 
population and prepare them for the future, billions of aid dollars have gone 
to foreign contractors and Afghan elites (Cusack and Malmstrom, 2010).
Given the fact that by 2015 the U.S. and its allies plan to hand over 
security and other responsibilities to the Afghan government, there will 
be significant cuts in spending and assistance with little or no indigenous 
production (outside of drugs) to pick up the slack. As a result, these cuts 
along with the country’s fractious politics and persistent insecurity are 
likely to push the economy into recession, derail the transition process 
and condemn the country to a long period of further violence and conflict 
(Cordesman and Mann, 2012).
Looking at the events in Afghanistan from the perspective of ExpECON, 
Cusack and Malmstrom (2010, 2011) through extensive field work and 
interviews found that despite government and donor community neglect 
of the Afghan private sector, this segment of the economy had tremendous 
potential for growth and employment generation. Further, many of the 
broad-based stereotypes often painted of entrepreneurs in conflict settings 
were completely wrong. In particular they found that:
1. Afghan businesses are responding rationally to economic incentives in 
a highly distorted economic environment.
2. Uncertainty and unpredictability, not physical insecurity, are the fun-
damental obstacles to business.
3. Businesses are adapting strategies such as vertical integration, pursu-
ing short-term trading over long-term enterprises, and “buying” secu-
rity in multiple ways.
4. Many business people believe that the Afghan government not only 
fails to provide basic services but also engages in corruption that 
directly threatens their businesses; and
5. International actors distort the business environment in ways harmful 
to Afghan businesses.
From these findings, it is easy to conclude that the Afghan private sector 
had the potential for growth and positive change – if only given a chance 
in the form of some degree of stability and institutional reliability.
These points are elaborated on and further documented in another 
study approached from an expeditionary perspective. Dahl (2011) found 
many of the causes underlying the Afghan business responses noted above 
stemmed from actions not taken in the early days following the overthrow 
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of the Taliban. As he notes (Dahl, 2011, p. 4), transitional environments 
like Afghanistan’s are often “typified by a political economy within which 
powerful non-state actors develop inappropriate alliances with state offi-
cials and run illicit enterprises that violate the rights of their fellow citizens 
and suffocate illicit entrepreneurial growth”. These findings lead him to 
conclude that the U.S. together with its NATO allies and the Afghan gov-
ernment had a strategic, moral and legal obligation to immediately estab-
lish effective rule of law institutions. Specifically, “stabilizing forces must 
establish (or support) institutions that are capable of preventing, inves-
tigating and punishing corruption and criminality”. Failure to do this in 
Afghanistan has been a major factor contributing to the on-going instabil-
ity and the private sector’s inability to create jobs and hope for the future.
The one bright spot in Afghanistan has been the country’s recent 
bottom-up attempt at stimulating the economy and improving govern-
ance at the local level. The country’s National Solidarity Program (NSP) 
is a community driven development (CDD) program. In Afghanistan, the 
NSP mandates the creation of a Community Development Council (CDC) 
in nearly every village across the country. The NSP in effect empowers 
local community groups over planning decisions and investment resources 
through a process that emphasizes participatory planning and account-
ability (Nijssen, 2012). To date, there have been many NSP success stories. 
The NSP has achieved concrete successes at considerably lower prices than 
large-scale initiatives.
To advocates of ExpECON, the Afghanistan case illustrates the prob-
lems associated with attempting a top-down development strategy imple-
mented by a corrupt, dysfunctional central government in an environment 
of uncoordinated aid programs with little or no focus on assisting the 
private sector. Out of this environment, it is little wonder that NATO 
efforts at restoring peace and stability to the country have stalled on a 
number of fronts. The inability to make initial strides at developing and 
implementing the rule of law impeded a vibrant entrepreneurial class that 
was more than capable of restoring stability and growth to the country. 
The early successes of the country’s belated NSP program further rein-
force their contention of the superiority of a bottom-up, community-
based development strategy relying on broad-based public participation. 
If improved governance at the local level can be built and sustained, the 
country’s entrepreneurial energies may finally be unleashed.
Iraq
Iraq’s post conflict economy (outside of the oil sector) has floundered. 
Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the country has been plagued 
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with high levels of unemployment and relatively stagnant private sector 
employment. For all practical purposes, job creation in the formal sector 
was confined to the public sector and was financed with the country’s 
abundant oil revenues (United Nations, 2009). A large shadow economy 
of low-productivity firms and illegal activities continues to employ a large 
segment of the labor force (Looney, 2005).
Like Afghanistan, most of Iraq’s economic problems can be traced 
back to mistakes made early in the coalition occupation. The U.S. eco-
nomic strategy in Iraq appeared to start on a very promising note. It 
closely followed the textbook shock therapy model (Looney, 2003) suc-
cessfully implemented in countries like Chile after the fall of Allende, and 
Poland after the overthrow of Communism. The primary purpose of the 
neoliberal/Washington Consensus-based reforms was to generate needed 
efficiency in Iraq’s morbid socialist economy though the release of com-
petitive forces (Looney, 2004). As in many post-Communist countries, a 
secondary objective of the shock therapy program was to wipe the slate 
clean through removing all Ba’athists from positions of authority and 
influence (Looney, 2004a). The strategy was designed and implemented 
with little or no Iraqi input.
Another aspect of the strategy was to create macroeconomic stability 
through an independent central bank, with the government remaining 
largely passive in dealing with the economy. The country hoped for a 
competitive, non-inflationary economy. This scenario was seen as an ideal 
environment for high job creation through rapid private sector invest-
ment. Free trade and capital movements were designed for a maximum 
inflow of foreign investment and the transfer of needed technology. A 
massive infrastructure program was designed to lower private-sector pro-
duction costs, stimulating waves of follow-on investment and jobs. The 
role of the Iraqi government was largely to keep out of the way.
The limitations of the economic program became quickly apparent. 
Rather than creating an environment of efficiency and growth, it pro-
duced one in which criminals and extremists were able to thrive. The 
strategy shut large numbers of Iraqis with no skills or capital out of the 
economic process, fueling widespread anger. In the face of increased vio-
lence, together with political and economic uncertainty, it was impossible 
to attract the private investment from which the strategy depended.
There is no plan B in Washington Consensus programs of this type 
(Roland, 2001). The inability to produce sustainable short-run economic 
gains made the program’s economic reforms an easy target for extremist 
groups. As a result, the intended and necessary deepening and refinement 
of the Washington Consensus reforms did not occur. Instead, the gov-
ernance vacuum was filled by existing organized religious and  criminal 
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groups. The incomplete reforms (Gunter, 2009) also created profit-
able black market and rent-seeking opportunities, further opening up the 
country to exploitation by criminal groups and corrupt politicians.
In addition to a hostile regulatory environment, criminal activity, and 
corruption, the deterioration of social capital in Iraq has stifled private 
sector development and entrepreneurial activity (Putnam, 2004; Looney, 
2008, 2008a). In the Iraqi context, social capital represents trust, and 
without trust there is little hope of the establishment of efficient markets, 
at the national as well as the provincial level. Instead, entrepreneurship 
thrives at the tribal and local levels (Desai, 2009, 2010) where high levels 
of trust still exist.
To advocates of ExpECON, the Iraq case illustrates the folly of impos-
ing an ill-suited development strategy on a country ill-prepared to imple-
ment it in a consistent way. While striving for an efficient economy with 
state-of-the-art infrastructure, the strategy focused on the longer-term 
with little regard for job creation in the short run. By largely excluding 
Iraqis from the initial strategy formulations, Ministries were ill-equipped 
to assume authority with the withdrawal of U.S. forces. With the with-
drawal of coalition forces, Iraqis have refused to accept the transfer of 
many projects because they were not involved in the design and therefore 
unsure of the subsequent costs of repair and maintenance. The resulting 
waste of aid and reconstruction resources has been staggering (Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009).
In sum, low levels of social capital-based trust suggest that entrepre-
neurial activity has the greatest chance to thrive at the local and tribal 
level. At the outset, if a bottom-up development strategy stressing 
community-based development along the lines of Afghanistan’s NSP had 
been adopted and nurtured by the occupying forces it would have created 
sustainability (Keys, 2012), and many of the problems now plaguing Iraq 
would not have developed.
Iraq and Afghanistan’s environments demonstrate a common thread of 
similarities that, in retrospect, might have been better dealt with through 
applying many of the principles of ExpECON’s flexible community-
oriented bottom-up strategy, rather than the rigid, no contingency top-
down approach. The contrast between the two basic post-conflict recovery 
models – bottom-up and top-down – share many of the components noted 
in the economic development literature debates between the advocates of 
a Washington Consensus (largely top-down) and those championing the 
Evolutionary-Institutionalist Perspective (bottom-up). One could term the 
former the big bang or the shock therapy view, and the latter the gradual-
ist or incremental view.
As expected, the ExpECON approach shares many similarities with the 
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Evolutionary Institutionalist approach, which is rooted in a “philosophi-
cal skepticism influenced by Hayek and Popper, with a strong emphasis 
on our relative ignorance of economic and social systems and their trans-
formation and emphasis on the uncertainty associated with societal engi-
neering and a strong aversion to any kind of . . . large scale institutional 
transformation” (Roland 2001, 32). This set of principles captures both 
the strength and weakness of expeditionary economics. Its strength lies 
in its flexibility and adaptability to different and evolving situations. Its 
weakness lies in the fact that the same imprecision makes it difficult for 
bureaucratic organizations to effectively apply it in the field.
ExpECON EXTENSIONS/FUTURE EVOLUTION/
AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
Although it is unlikely the United States and its allies will engage in future 
conflicts on the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan, many themes common to 
those conflicts will run through future engagements. Defense ministers 
will be confronted by the challenge of militant groups that find sanctuary 
and build training bases inside failed states. In the absence of a legitimate 
government able to expel them, they could mobilize popular support and 
extend their control by taking on some of the functions of government, 
including service delivery and development.
Western militaries have come to the realization that this type of problem 
does not have a purely military solution. While ground could be captured, 
it could not necessarily be retained and pacified without the support 
of the local population. A more flexible response was to provide relief 
and reconstruction as a key component of the military operation. If the 
military continues to take on this type of activity, what likely issues might 
ExpECON face?
1. Implementation on the Ground. The U.S. was able to allocate consid-
erable sums to the projects in Iraq and Afghanistan (Fischerkeller, 
2011; Johnson et al., 2012a) through the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP). Military officers with the rank of captain 
or major or higher can receive CERP funds to design and implement 
projects such as building roads, schools and the like (Patterson and 
Robinson, 2011). Many valuable lessons have been learned from 
the CERP program (Johnson et al., 2012b) that are applicable to 
ExpECON. Building on the CERP experience, ExpECON could 
extend this operation to the support of community selected local 
entrepreneurs, providing them with seed money and security. This 
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may entail further training of officers in business practices, but it has 
worked in the past (Patterson, 2011). Del Castillo (2011a) has shown 
that it would be a fairly easy task to transform existing CERP pro-
grams into those incorporating the main components of ExpECON.
2. Lack of Supporting Environment. Would it be possible to generate 
much entrepreneurship in settings with limited governance of the type 
that supports entrepreneurial activity in other settings? Both the Iraqi 
and Afghan cases demonstrate the vitality of entrepreneurship in 
situations previously thought to be completely stifling for businesses. 
Empirical work suggests that a limited number of reforms, including 
trade liberalization and improved business freedom – fairly easy to 
implement, are sufficient to jump-start the economies in the income 
range of most failed states (Looney, 2012).
3. The Actions Over Time of Newly Created Entrepreneurs. The hope is 
these new entrepreneurs will be capable of initiating a virtual circle 
of growth, contributing to increase in government revenues, public 
sector reforms, growth in infrastructure and services, and economic 
expansion as characterized by the successful post-Communist trans-
formation of economies in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s 
(Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1999). Whether expanding numbers of 
entrepreneurs will play this positive role depends of which of Mancur 
Olson’s (1982) coalitions dominate over time. Olson distinguished 
between “distributional coalitions” which are seen as leading to out-
comes inimical to economic growth and “encompassing coalitions” 
which are seen as potentially aiding economic growth in a society. 
Hopefully, local communities will provide sufficient checks to assure 
the distributional coalitions emerge.
4. Applicability to Environments Not Involving the U.S. Military. There 
are likely to be many entities and countries attempting to combat 
domestic insurgencies in locations where U.S. or Western troops are 
not welcome. Generalizations are difficult, with the effectiveness of 
ExpECON. Situations vary according to the professionalism of the 
military, the quality of supporting institutions, and the openness of 
the government to capitalism and free markets. While countries are 
different and unique (Looney, 2012), ExpECON could nevertheless 
play an invaluable role especially in areas of the country that are out 
of the effective reach of the government. In the case of Pakistan, the 
country is equipped with a well-trained and educated military that 
would be capable in assisting and supporting new entrepreneurs. 
The country’s New Growth Framework provides a blueprint for the 
development and encouragement of private sector activities. Due to 
the fact that the Pakistani military is stretched thin and cannot provide 
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adequate security in every conflict district, new and creative solutions 
would be required. One possibility might be the creation of new recon-
struction zones along the lines proven successful in countries such as 
Afghanistan and Haiti (del Castillo, 2011a). In extreme situations, a 
more radical approach might be called for, such as the establishment 
of new economic zones, akin to those under consideration in Honduras 
(The Economist, 2011). In the Honduran model, a clean slate is formed 
with a virtual creation of a new city. The government would provide 
security, infrastructure and financing for new businesses. In turn, these 
economic zones would attract refugees from surrounding areas.
While ExpECON holds out great promise for future military operations 
there are inherent dangers that must be recognized. Combining recon-
struction with counterterrorism operations can present the military with 
conflicting objectives and gives mixed signals to local people. Dealing with 
one group, and not another, can spark unexpected group rivalries. Before 
the United States and other Western countries commit to ExpECON, a 
complete assessment and rewriting of military doctrine (U.S. Department 
of the Army, 2006) may be necessary for optimum results.
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